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THE PRICE OF OIL
R. W. Clack
Kansas State University
Manhattan, Kansas

Abstract
An examination of major forces in the petroleum market
with primary emphasis on the decade of the 1970s. The
market force (s) responsible for the factor-of-ten increase
in the price of crude oil is isolated, if not identified.
The market's "message" is set forth for energy policy planners.
1.

INTRODUCTION

3.

The world petroleum market experienced
generally unanticipated price discontinuities
in 1973 and again in 1979.

(Fig. 1)

Major market forces in commodities, whether
grain, mineral or livestock, are recognizable
without elaborate definition or scholarly
background in economics. These forces are

If the

market was, and is, rational, it should be
possible to identify the cause(s) of these
price discontinuities as something other than
fear or speculative greed. If the market is

listed here with no signficance to their
order:

rational, any attempt to force the sale of oil
at levels substantially removed from the
market-clearing price will unnecessarily
punish the economy and the citizens of the
country in which prices are so regulated.
2.

MARKET FORCES

(1)

Marginal cost of production

(2)

Fully allocated cost of production

(3)
(4)

Cost of an available substitute
Probable cost of an anticipated
substitute

(5)

An anticipated production-comsumption
imbalance

(6)

An actual production-consumption
imbalance

(7)

The cost of doing without.

MARKET DEFINITION

As used here, "the market" is the weighted
sum of the collective judgement of all parti
cipants to the commercial traffic in a given
commodity at any given moment. We impute
wisdom or prescience to the market even know
ing that many participants are motivated by
nothing more than the hope of making an extra

This list is not inclusive.

quick buck.

regarding the dramatic price changes in crude
oil in the 1970s. Rather than attempt

are unlisted subsets.

Moreover there

Nevertheless, an exam

ination of the market forces listed here is
adequate to reveal significant insight

Stability of inertia of the

market is enhanced by major long-range com
mittments. In the competitive market economic

precision definition of these forces, we cite
homely examples which convey meaning suffic
ient for the purpose of this paper.

error is generally borne by the author of the
error, whether personal or corporate.
By
contrast, bureaucratic market makers rarely

(1)
Marginal cost of production.
The incre
mental or extra cost associated with producing

admit and, therefore, rarely correct their
errors. The cost of bureaucratic market
error is "passed through" to the taxpayer or
consumer.

one extra unit of a commodity in question.
The marginal cost of producing an extra bushel
of corn, for example, may be the cost of
purchase and application of an extra 3 pounds
of nitrogen fertilizer.^
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Fig. 1 Price of Arab Light crude

Fig. 2

World oil reserves

Fig. 3 U.S. oil prcduction-oonsurrption

Fig. 4 U.S. oil reserves

(All graph data frcm API
Basic Petroleum Data Book)

Fig. 5 Oil production trend
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(2)

Fully allocated cost of production.

This

(6) Actual production-consumption imbalance.
This is an illusory force, analogous to that

is equal to the sum of the marginal cost plus
the fixed cost allocated to each unit of pro
duction. Fixed costs would generally include

of centripetal force.

perpetual production-consumption imbalance.
That which we perceive as an imbalance is
generally associated with a measurable
departure from historic production and con
sumption trends and by unusual inventory
levels.

capital depreciation, taxes, insurance, debt
service, base wages and salaries.
In the case
of crude oil, the fully allocated cost also
includes the cost of lifting the product and
the allocated cost of drilling and equipping
the well. Moreover, the allocated cost of all
drilling failures must be borne by successful

(7)

ountants cannot assess the cost of failure.
Somehow, the market knows the cost of failure.
If losers' losses exceed winners' gains, the
industry will shrink and ultimately die.
(3) Cost of an available substitute. If the
operator of a steam boiler can, with equal

4.

facility, burn oil or natural gas, the least
expensive fuel will be burned. Even if the
alternate fuel is never used, its mere exis

(1)

(4) Probable cost of anticipated substitute.
During the time interval commencing about
1955 and ending about 1975, the market price
of coal was significantly depressed by the

strained oil market in which world-wide
newly proven reserves exceeded world con
sumption, market prices would tend to decline
to the marginal cost of production of the
largest producer.
In such an hypothetical
circumstance, the market price for oil would

Anticipated consumption-production

decline below the marginal cost of production
in the U.S. and U. S. production would cease.
This, in fact, would have occurred in the

Since it is difficult to quantify

anticipation, there does not seem to be any
objective way to measure the impact of this
is real enough.

Marginal cost of production. Marginal

barrel whereas U.S. marginal costs are meas
ured in dollars per barrel.
In an unre

available substitute for coal but the anti
cipation of cheap nuclear energy did never
theless, significantly depress the market
price of coal for nearly 20 years.

No matter.

TESTING MARKET FORCES

marginal costs are measured in pennies per

anticipated cost of nuclear energy. For
reasons beyond the scope of this paper,
nuclear energy has not become a generally

factor on the market.

In the ex

cost of production tends to establish a floor
or lower price limit for a commodity.
To
sell below one's marginal cost of production
is, in effect, to give away money. Marginal
costs in oil production exhibit great diver
sity. Persian Gulf oil wells are typically
a thousand times as productive as U.S. on
shore wells. Accordingly, Persian Gulf

tence in the market will have significant
impact on the price of the fuel which is
burned.

imbalance.

The cost of doing without.

treme, a prospective consumer may have the
choice of paying the asking price for a pro
duct or doing without the product or its us
able substitute. This factor is rarely pre
sent in a market unless an irreplacable in
ventory is being exhausted. Food in a block
aded city would be an example.

production even if producers and their acc

(5)

There cannot exist a

decade of the 1950s and 1960s had not the U.S.
government imposed import quotas on foreign
oil during these two decades when world
reserves increased by about 450 billion
barrels while world consumption increased
from about 6 billion barrels per year to 16

The impact

If one correlates weather

forecasts in the citrus belt with prices in
the orange juice futures market one can read
ily discern the impact of an anticipated
freeze. If the forecast freeze does not
materialize, however, futures prices generally return to their pre-forecast level.

billion barrels per year.
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station power plants are equipped to burn
either coal or oil in which case coal, with
the sufferance of EPA, would be an available

As long as world oil reserves were rising,
i.e., prior to 1970. (Fig. 2) it was possi
ble for the U.S. to sustain a two-tier market
to the major disadvantage of Persian Gulf
producers. As late as 1968, Persian Gulf
residual oil was delivered on the U.S.
east coast for less than $1 per barrel, a
price far below the cost of replacing either

substitute for oil. Although free-marlcet oil
costs about six times as much as coal on an
energy-equivalent basis, there has been no
overwhelming rush to convert to coal. The
price disparity between coal and oil reflects
the limited degree to which coal can be sub
stituted for oil.

our domestic gas or oil reserves.
(By con
trast, we now pay about 27 times that price,
on an energy equivalent basis, for imported
natural gas.) Once world oil reserves sta

Natural gas is a potential substitute for
oil. Because U.S. reserves and production
both peaked within two years of 1970, natural
gas can be substituted for oil only in quite
2
limited circumstances.
Economic and tech

bilized around 1970, in the face of rising
world demand, world oil prices commenced to
rise such that marginal production costs
were no longer a limiting factor in oil

nical factors would permit the expanded use
of coal and nuclear to offset our declining

markets.
Hence it is apparent that marginal
cost of production was not a significant

reserves and production of oil but political
factors have prevented such substitutions
such that our reliance upon imported oil has

factor during the price discontinuities of
the 1970s.

continued to grow.

(2) Fully allocated cost of production.
Fully allocated costs of oil production in
clude the allocated costs of geology serv

(Fig. 3) Of the many ex

otic sources of energy--fuel wood, tar sand,
shale oil, alcohol, wind and solar--none are
available now in quantity sufficient to match

ices, drilling and equipping wells and any
associated dry hole costs in addition to the
marginal costs. Prior to 1973, many mature
oil reservoirs in the U.S. operated between

our declining domestic reserves.

(Fig. 4)

(4)
Probable cost of an anticipated substi
tute . Sooner or later, it appears that we
must find energy sources to substitute for

the marginal cost of production and the fully
allocated cost of production.

our finite oil and gas resources. Although
we may hope for some technical development
that will make solar or fusion energy prac

As with marginal costs, fully allocated costs
of oil production tend to establish a lower
market limit. Since the price discontinu

tical and economic, prudence demands that we

ities of 1973 and 1979 involved rising
prices, it is apparent that this factor,
fully allocated costs, was not a significant
contributor in the discontinuities.

address our attention to synthetic fuels
from coal and/or shale because the necessary
technology is at hand and our domestic re
serves of coal and shale are large. Indeed

(3) Cost of an available substitute. Al
though there are many potential substitutes
for oil, there are relatively few available
now in commercial quantities. Some central

the U.S. is addressing the matter of syn
thetic fuel production as reflected in the
table following:

TABLE 1.

COSTS OR PROJECTED COSTS OF SELECTED U.S. SYNFUEL PROJECTS

Identity
SRC-1
SRC-II
Exxon Don. S .
W. R. Grace
Am. Nat. Res.

Location
Est. Cost($)
Cap, (bbl/day)
Newman, KY
1.5 billion
2 0 , 000* *
Morgantown, WV 1.4 billion
20,000
Baytown, TX
350 million
600
Baskett, KY
3.0 billion
55,000
Mercer C o , ND
1.4 billion
21 , 000**
*0ne barrel per day production capacity is on< daily-barrel.
arrel-equivalent for non-liquid fuel.
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Cost ($/daily-barrel*I
75,000?,

77

70,000^3

580,000^?
54,500*bld
66,000

The weighted average of these costs ^/dailybarrel) is 65,000. Conventional oil, by concontrast sells for about $35,000/d-b, although

■multi-billion dollar engineering projects
have a way of escalating from 2 to 10 times
if the Trans Alaska Pipeline and various

that figure is difficult to draw into focus
because of the several categories of oil,
arbitrary oil pricing and varying tax lia

nuclear projects are any guide. There is
little doubt however but that the freemarket is, by trial and error, pushing the

bilities under U.S. "energy policy". To a
first approximation, production, measured in
daily-barrels, sells for about 1000 times the
market value of a barrel of oil.
(This re

price of natural crude toward the estimated
cost of synthetic fuel substitutes.
(5) An anticipated production-consumption
imbalance. Just as a freeze forecast will
drive up the price of orange juice, the
threat of an oil supply interruption will
drive up the price of oil. Fig. 1 illus
trates the relationship between the price of
Arab Light crude and two major political

lationship implies a 2.8 year payout or 36%
return on investment if there were no pro
duction decline, no taxes, no insurance and
no production costs.)
Although a synthetic oil plant should not be
subject to the characteristic time-rate of
decline in production of a natural oil reser
voir, operating costs can be expected to be
much higher than for production from a nat
ural oil reservoir. To a first approximation,

events which threatened world oil supplies.
(Spot oil prices were somewhat more volatile
than the prices reflected in Fig. 1 but these
prices have, nevertheless, tended to stabi
lize near the the price of Arab Light.

these factors will balance out. Hence we can
expect a barrel of synthetic oil to cost about
l/1000th of the daily-barrel capacity cost.

Anticipation undoubtedly accounts for the

If, then, synthetic capacity costs $65,000 per
daily-barrel, synthetic oil will cost about
$65 per barrel as compared to about $35 per
barrel for the current free-market price of

at these lofty levels.
(It is worth recall
ing that Saudi Arabia embargoed oil to the

natural oil.

sharp runup in oil prices in 1973 and 1979
but it does not explain what held oil prices

U.S. during the Arab-Israel war of 1967 also
but that embargo was ineffective because U.S.

Other people may also have

drawn that same conclusion.

production was rising as fast in 1967 as it
was falling in 1973 and we were not importing
enough Arab oil to make much of an impact in
the U.S. oil market.)

Consider the

statement of OPEC deputy secretary-general,
Fadhil al-Chalabi, ". ..world prices should
eventually double to $60/bbl to bring them
(°il prices) in line with synfuel prices."^

(6)

An actual production-consumption imbal

ance . If the anticipation of shortened sup
plies drove the price of oil up in 1973 and
1979, did subsequent events confirm the anti
cipation to account for the quasi-stable
newly higher prices? Table 2 indicates that
world oil production was scarcely perturbed

For the record, there are studies by repu
table authorities projecting shale oil costs
38 ^ow as $15/bbl.^ If such a price proves
ut and if such shale production capacity can
be expanded at a rate to offset the decline
toiU.S. conventional oil production commencing
^ 1970 then the world price of oil will

during either the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo
or the 1979 turmoil in Iran.

decline to match the price of shale oil. The
question remains, however, if shale oil can
be produced for $15/bbl, why are we paying,
on the margin, $30 to $40/bbl for the natural
product?
Unfortunately, no one knows what synfuel is
going to cost. Even the highest estimate
cited here may be far off the mark because
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TABLE

SELECTED OIL PRODUCTION DATA, (x 1(T BBL/YEAR)7
REGION

YEAR

MIDDLE EAST

FREE WORLD

TOTAL WORLD

1972

6.63

16.35

18.60

1973
1974

7.45
7.99

16.76
16.54

20.37
20.54

1978
1979

7.88
7.80

17.20
17.64

22.16
22.77

I

It is true that Iranian production of oil
has fallen from nearly 6 million barrels per

5.

CONCLUSIONS

Examination of the market forces or limits

day in 1974 to essentially zero at the pre
sent time but increased production rom other
countries or regions more than made up for

cited here suggests that the absolute bound
aries for oil prices are: marginal cost of
production on the low side and cost of doing
without on the high side. The more practical

the loss of Iranian oil.
(Fig. 5) Hence we
must look elsewhere for the cause of the
sustained high prices for oil in the 1970s.

boundaries are the fully allocated cost of
production (lower limit) and the probable cost
of an anticipated substitute (upper limit).

(7) Cost of doing without. The cost of an
abrupt loss of liquid fuel supply would be
the collapse of western industrial society.

As it turns out, the spread between these

In the short run, if we lose our liquid fuel

production today.

latter limits is quite wide for most oil
The actual price of crude

supply, we lose all of our engineered energy.

oil today lies in the middle of that spread

Without liquid fuel we cannot mine or trans
port coal, operate nuclear power plants,

but trending upward until, 1) world reserves

transport fertilizer, cultivate the land or
transport and process human food. We would

duction of snythetic oil is demonstrated at
or below the current price of oil. What

stabilize or 2) large-scale commercial pro

be forced to decentralize and resort to a

should U.S. government energy policy be to

subsistence type society such as characteriz-1
ed by the frontier settlers in North America
150 years ago. The cost, to the extent it

assure a continued economic supply of liquid
fuel? The answer:
NOTHING, the government
has done too much already. Without intending

could be measured in dollars might be the

to condemn everything government has done in

collapse of the GNP (gross national product)
from $2.2 trillion to perhaps $0.2 trillion
(still leaving us affluent compared to the

of some of our government's achievements in
energy:

really poor societies of the world).

the energy field, there follows a short list

--Subsidized oil when it was cheap and
plentiful

Thus

the loss of the 6 billion barrels of oil we,
in the U.S., consume each year would cost us
$2 trillion or about $330 per barrel.
Man is adaptive and ingenious.

--Discriminatorily taxed oil when it is
scare and dear
--Killed a negotiated deal for $2.60/Mcf
natural gas from Mexico

Given the a-

brupt loss of liquid fuel, we would undoubt
edly suffer greviously in the short run but

--Negotiated a substitute contract for
Mexican natural gas at $4.47 plus
escalators

we would surely learn to accommodate to the
new life if we could avoid major civil

--Mandated the sale of domestic natural
gas at less than its replacement cost
thus

strife while adapting. Meanwhile, $330 per
barrel for oil represents an hypothetical
upper limit on oil price.
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-Encouraging the construction of 30
million dwellings with uneconomic

duct will cost $10/Mcf.

costs in $/d-b or Mcf may seem abstract but
we can make the case in "real world" terms:
suppose your home heating bill was $150 last

insulation
-Encouraged burning of natural gas for
boiler fuel
-Beggared the domestic coal industry
by forcing competition with cheap

January, and suppose further that some winter
soon you must use synthetic gas from the
Mercer Co. plant at $10/Mcf. Your monthly
gas bill will have gone to $750.

gas
-Drove U.S. oil exploration efforts

Whether a few of us pay a lot or many of us

abroad
— Generated panic and long lines by in
truding in the administration of

pay a little, we will somehow have to pay for
the Mercer Co. plant by paying a fantastic
premium for its gas over what free-market do

gasoline distribution

mestic gas would cost or contracted imported
gas from Mexico or Canada would cost
($4.47/Mcf).

In short, the governmental itch to regulate
has turned an energy supply challenge into an
energy supply crisis and greatly heightened
the risk of war in the bargain. Whatever the

The market, in its wisdom, is trying to price
petroleum at a level matched to the cost of
developing our future energy supplies, whether

defects of the competitive free market and
capricious though it is, the free market will
ultimately recognize and correct its mistakes
while bureaucratic administrators will ride

natural or synthetic. Our government, in the
name of consumer protection, is trying to tax
away that pool of capital represented by the
"windfall" on unproduced but proven reserves.
For both strategic and economic reasons, our

them to the grave.
Scholars and observers have been predicting
oil and natural gas shortages for more than
100 years. No one doubts that world reserves

government should be trying to stimulate the
expansion of economic fuel reserves.
In fact,
the government is suppressing the expansion
of economic reserves and encouraging the ex
pansion of uneconomic (synthetic) reserves in

and production will ultimately peak and then
commence an inevitable decline but in fact
no one knows when this peak will come if the
free market is given rein. By contrast, ad

the questionable belief that there is no more
oil or gas to be found at any price.

ministered markets have already induced an
artifical peak in reserves and production. A
recent response to more realistic oil and
natural gas prices has slightly strengthened

If we are "out" of natural oil and gas re
serves, a profit-driven industry will dis
cover that fact soon enough, the price of
remaining natural reserves will rise to the
synthetic replacement cost and industry will
make the timely transition.
If, on the other
hand, we are not out of natural reserves, the
consequence of government coerced, premature
transition will be privation for all.

fluid fuel reserves and production but what
the government giveth the government taketh
away. The "windfall profits" tax means that
some of our most successful oil producers re
mit nearly 907o of a barrel of oil revenue to
the government. We are punishing successful
oil producers when we should be

To speak of energy

rewarding
1.

them. If government forces premature conver
sion to synthetic fuel we will be greviously
punished. Consider, for example, the Mercer
Co., ND Synthetic gas plant.
The forecast

Doane's Agricultural Report, 148.2

2.

API (American Petroleum Institute) Basic
Petroleum Data Book, Section XIII
3 . Barron1s National Business and Financial
Weekly, Aug. 11, 1980

capital cost is $66,000 per daily-barrelequivalent. If the relationship between fuel
Pfice and capacity price set forth in para
graph 4.(4) is valid, it means that the pro
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4.

Fortune, Oct. 6, 1980, pg. 48-49

5.
6.
7.

Oil & Gas Journal, Sept. 8, 1980, pg. 3
Oil & Gas Journal, June 16, 1980, pg. 56
API Basic Petroleum Data Book, Section IV
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